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PALESTINIAN CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE
JERUSALEM AREA
Ifrah Zilberman*
After achieving independence, most Arab states founded their legal
systems on Western constitutional concepts. Arab societies, however,
continued to practice traditional customary law. The more a state tried to
force society to use its own law, the more society depended on customary
law to regulate its internal affairs. Thus, the advent of modernity in Arab
states paradoxically strengthened conservative trends in society. Palestin-
ian society, being under the rule of another state, retained the use of cus-
tomary law even more than other Arab societies.
Several studies discussed the phenomenon of customary law in Pales-
tinian society.' Others have documented the use of customary law in
other Arabic-speaking societies in the Middle East.2 The past few years
have witnessed growing research interest in customary law as part of the
mechanisms by which states seek to exert control over their "traditional"
societal norms, and the internal use of customary law by these societies.'
* This Article is the result of anthropological field work in the Jerusalem area. I am
grateful for the support of the Israeli Foundations Trustees (Grant no. 88, 1988-90) and the
Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies. An early version of the first part of this article ap-
peared in Hebrew in Hamizrah Hehadash, 1991. 1 thank Mr. R. Nassraalla for his most
valuable help in researching this Article.
1. See JOSEPH GINAT, BLOOD DISPUTES AMONG BEDOUIN AND RURAL ARABS IN
ISRAEL (U. of Pittsburgh Press 1987); G. KERSEL, BLOOD FEUDS AMONG URBAN
BEDOUINS (Jerusalem: Magnes Press Heb. 1982); A. Layish & A. Shmueli, Custom and
Shari'a in the Bedouin Family according to Legal Documents from the Judean Desert, 42
BSOAS 21-45 (1979); see also G. SALAHUT, THE CUSTOMARY LAW (Acer, Dar al-Aswar.
Arb. 1987); G. Salahut, The Customary Law of the Tribes, in 21 AL-KATEB. 65-88 (Arb.
1981).
2. See F.H. Stewart, Tribal law in the Arab World, A Review of the Literature, 17
IJMES 474-480 (1987); J.W. CATHIE, MEDIATION AND SOCIETY-CONFLICT MANAGE-
MENT IN LEBANON (Academic Press 1980); A. Layish, Customary Khul as Reflected in the
Sijjil of the Libyan Shari'a Courts, LI BSOAS pt. 3, 428-434 (1988).
3. See SALLY F. MOORE, SOCIAL FACTS AND FABRICATIONS: "CUSTOMARY" LAW ON
KILIMANJARO, 1880-1980, at 9-10 (Cambridge: Cambridge U. Press 1986) (reviewing the
anthropological theory of customary law); see also A.'A AL-'ABADI, CUSTOMARY LAW
AMONG THE JORDANIAN TRIBES (Amman: Dar al-Bashir. Arb. 1988); JOHN DAVIS, LIB-
YAN POLITICS - TRIBE AND REVOLUTION: AN ACCOUNT OF THE ZUWAYA AND THEIR
GOVERNMENT (London: Tauris 1987); A. Oweidi, Bedouin Justice in Jordan (1982) (un-
published Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University).
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Customary law is perceived not only as a traditional element or a relic of
the past, but also as a dynamic social system that is being adapted con-
stantly to the changing needs of societies in the process of modernization.
In this context, Moore developed a paradigm that emphasizes the impor-
tance of historical metamorphoses of social institutions, and notes their
integration into economic, religious, and political contexts.4 This Article
uses Moore's paradigm to analyze the Palestinian institution of customary
law. This institution is part of the cultural bricolage that characterizes a
society trapped between tradition and modernity.
This Article presents an analysis of Palestinian customary law in the
Jerusalem area. It may appear that circumstances in a modern city such
as Jerusalem leave no room for customary law, which could be perceived
exclusively as an aspect of rural society and culture. However, customary
law is of prime importance in Palestinian society, and has demonstrated a
unique ability to adapt itself to the circumstances of a modern city. For
example, most traffic accidents involving Palestinians of East Jerusalem
trigger customary law arbitration.5
Following the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987, the use of
customary law in Palestinian society was intensified by radical Islamic
movements such as the Hamas, as well as by the Intifada's secular-na-
tional leadership, the Unified National Command. The signing of the
Oslo agreements after the decline of the Intifada and the founding of the
Palestinian National Authority has not given rise to the establishment of
state law. Customary law has become both a resource of the Palestinian
Authority in creating national institutions, especially in the Jerusalem
area, and a contested issue between the Palestinian Authority and the
Islamic movements. It is viewed as an intermediate stage on the road to
statehood-a means of linking the mostly traditional society to the em-
bryonic semi-state structure.
PALESTINIAN CUSTOMARY LAW IN A SocIo-HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE
During the Ottoman Period (1517-1917), the state recognized custom-
ary law as a legitimate source of jurisprudence. The Ottoman judges in
Jerusalem incorporated local customary law ('Urf) into imperial law (Ca-
non) and Islamic law (Shari'a).6 The Ottoman use of customary law re-
4. MOORE, supra note 3, at 1-13 (1986).
5. See, e.g., AL-QUDs, July 13, 1989; see also V. ABU SHAMSIYYA, CUSTOMARY LAW
IN THE AREA OF HEBRON 16-17 (Hebron: Matba'at al-E'itisam, Arb. 1989) (noting that
traffic accidents trigger most cases of customary law in the Hebron area).
6. See URIEL HEYD, STUDIES IN OLD OTTOMAN CRIMINAL LAw 167-71 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press 1973); JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 90-91 (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press 1966).
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flected its military weakness in the area of Jerusalem: it served as a means
of compromise with local rural forces, and also demonstrated the relative
autonomy of the social groups dwelling in the mountains surrounding Je-
rusalem. Customary law became a cultural component which has charac-
terized Palestinian society at least since the sixteenth century.7
In Hebron, south of Jerusalem, customary law developed in a different
way. Since the Ottoman state was unable to control the rural and tribal
societies surrounding the town, Hebronite merchants were obliged to rely
on customary law as the sole means for mediating conflicts and were
forced to adapt to the structure of society accordingly. To achieve this
adaptation, the Hebronite kin-groups had to maximize cohesion and co-
liability. This co-liability led to the protection of members of a clan,
which, when necessary, would respond to or exact revenge for any insult
to a member's honor.8
The early twentieth century was a time of socio-economic crisis in the
area to the south of Jerusalem, aggravated by massive population
growth.9 The economic base of Hebron was too weak to support the live-
lihood of its inhabitants, who were forced to migrate to Jerusalem. By
the 1990s, Hebron migrants accounted for more than fifty percent of the
population of East Jerusalem. The fierce competition for resources in
Hebron triggered further changes in the social structure of the city in the
1930s, and hence the institution of customary law in Jerusalem. 10 Due to
co-liability and group cohesion, disputes between individuals immediately
evolved into disputes between their clans. The dynamic equilibrium be-
tween social segments led to a balance of power between warring factions
and greatly reduced the probability of blood feuds.
This use of customary law as a mechanism of equilibrium and concilia-
tion within Palestinian and neighboring societies is described by Gran-
7. See 0. Salame, Shari'a, State Law and Customary Law in Jerusalem by the Begin-
ning of the Ottoman Times 13-14 (1982) (unpublished manuscript, Heb.).
8. See AMNON COHEN & BERNARD LEWIS, POPULATION AND REVENUE IN THE
TOWNS OF PALESTINE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY 107 (Princeton: Princeton U. Press
1978). For an analysis of customary law in the Jerusalem area in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, see A. Mana'a, Sanjac Jerusalem Between Two Invasions-Administra-
tion and Society 182-83, 283, 322, 328-29 (1986) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Hebrew
University).
9. For a discussion of the demographic development of Hebron, see I. KARMON & A.
SHMUELI, HEBRON: THE PROFILE OF A MOUNTAIN TowN 75-76 (Tel Aviv: Gome (Heb.
1970)).
10. For analysis of the social structure in Hebron and its relation to the segmentary
model, see Ifrah Zilberman, Change and Continuity amongst Muslim Migrants to Jerusa-
lem 165-67 (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University).
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quist,11 Marx,12 Cathie,13 Antoun,14 and Lutfiyya .15 However, customary
law is not only a mechanism of equilibrium and conciliation within a soci-
ety, but also a vehicle of inter-clan rivalry and struggle for domination.
Cohen 16 and Kersel17 cite examples of such application of customary law
in Palestinian society. The rival social groups they describe intensified
and expanded certain disputes, and mitigated others, in a calculated and
controlled manner.
Indeed, among Hebronites and other groups in the Jerusalem area, cus-
tomary law serves as a mechanism of equilibrium and conciliation in cer-
tain cases, and in others, as a mechanism of rivalry and domination.
However, it also acts against the backdrop of processes of inter-clan fu-
sion. 8 In such a process, some clans combine to form a large coalition
sharing a common "name," a genealogy that is largely artificial, and a
myth concerning the new group's origins. The fusion of several small
groups into one large unit unfolds as a chain reaction, and invests this
unit with a wider co-liability. Therefore, such composite units impose
their authority on smaller groups, and claim a larger share of resources in
the Jerusalem area. The smaller, dominated groups, form or join other
coalitions. Thus, several dominant social blocks emerge and, indeed, be-
come dominant in the arena of customary law.
The ability of Hebronites to relate to their community as a single co-
liability group played an important role in the process of their migration
to Jerusalem. From the 1930s, Hebronites who had migrated to Jerusa-
lem began to use co-liability and customary law as tools for the attain-
ment of economic and political objectives and the consolidation of their
status in the City. The migrant Hebronites lacked prestige, political con-
11. HILMA GRANQUIST, MUSLIM DEATH AND BURIAL 111-120 (1963), reprinted in
COMMENTATIONES HUMANARUM LII-ERARUM XXXIV (1965).
12. E. MARX, THE BEDOUIN SOCIETY OF THE NEGEV 193-94 (Tel Aviv: Reshafim.
Heb. 1974).
13. J.W. CATHIE, MEDIATION AND SOCIETY-CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN LEBANON
49-73 (Academic Press 1980).
14. RICHARD T. ANTOUN, ARAB VILLAGE: A SOCIAL STRUCTURAL STUDY OF TRANS-
JORDANIAN PEASANT COMMUNITY 40-43 (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press 1972).
15. ABDULLA M. LUTFIYYA, BAYTIN, A JORDANIAN VILLAGE 92-100 (The Hague:
Mouton 1966).
16. ABNER COHEN, ARAB BORDER VILLAGES IN ISRAEL 58-71 (Manchester:
Manchester U. Press 1965).
17. KERSEL, supra note 1.
18. On the debate about the segmentary system, fusion, and fission mechanisms, see
DALE F. EICKELMAN, THE MIDDLE EAST: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACH 98-104
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall 1981); E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1949); ERNEST GELLNER, SAINTS OF THE ATLAS 35-69 (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1969); E. Peters, Some Structural Aspects of the Feuds among the
Camel Herding Bedouins of Cyrenica, 37 AFRICA 262-82 (1967).
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tacts, and possessions. To offset this, they made use of their cohesion for
several purposes: (a) to create a common denominator among the
Hebronite migrants who stemmed from the more than one hundred
Hebronite clans; (b) for political empowerment which enabled the mi-
grants to establish an economic base in Jerusalem, especially by utilizing
Islamic Endowments (Awqaf); and (c) to regulate their own economic
activity in Jerusalem through customary law, as they had done in Hebron.
The Hebronite migrants also aspired to impose their customary law on
the City's established population. By 1948, they had efficiently applied
customary law to fashion a position of dominance and power in society.
Such a system of customary law which is practiced in order to dominate
may be termed "predatory."
Under Jordanian rule (1947-1967), the Hebronites formed a political
alliance with the Hashemite regime, and reaped its rewards.19 The
Jordanians had codified their customary law and thus regarded it as a
legitimate part of their jurisprudence.2 ° Therefore, Hebron customary
law gained the support of the Jordanian regime in Jerusalem. During the
1950s, Hebron customary law became the dominant informal legal sys-
tem, and served as a means of regulating the economy.
The annexation of East Jerusalem by Israel in June 1967 presented the
resident Palestinians with an identity problem. The Israelis imposed their
law and civil identity, while allowing the Palestinians to keep their
Jordanian citizenship and maintain their link to Jordanian law.21 Pales-
tinians preserved religious autonomy in Jerusalem through the use of Is-
lamic courts, under the Jordanian Department of Islamic Endowments.
Obviously, the population of East Jerusalem needed an internal system to
mediate and resolve disputes without recourse to the Israeli courts.
Hebronite customary law was the only system that could perform this
function after 1967.
19. N. Dana, Religious Personages in the Islamic Establishment of the West Bank
under the Jordanian Rule (Heb. 1974) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
Dana notes that Hebronites were conspicuously represented in the Council of Islamic
Scholars (Hayat al-'Ulama) appointed by the Jordanian government. One, for example,
became the Qadi of Jerusalem. See also NORMAN H. GOSENFELD, THE SPATIAL DIVISION
OF JERUSALEM 298-301 (1973) (stating that the proportion of Hebronites among business
owners in Jerusalem increased from 33.2% in 1950 to 39.8% in 1956 and 42% in 1960).
20. A. Oweidi, Bedouin Justice in Jordan 322 (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cam-
bridge University); 'A AL-'ABADI, supra note 3, at 187-91.
21. The Jordanian government only legally disengaged from the West Bank in August
1988. However, the Jordanians maintained their attachment to Jerusalem and its Islamic
Endowments Department, and even in 1995 did not agree to relinquish it to the Palestinian
Authority's control.
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Hebronite customary law in Jerusalem has evolved into a system whose
main importance lies in the regulation of economic activity and the reso-
lution of economic disputes. It also has become a vehicle for maintaining
local autonomy vis-A-vis the Israeli government and judicial system, and
has served to mediate internal political processes. Despite the many
problems arising from its application and enforcement, as well as doubts
about the integrity of some of its arbitrators, the Palestinians adopted
customary jurisprudence since they had no other reasonable means of
conducting their economic life under the constraints imposed by Israel,
Jordan, and the PLO.
THE STRUCTURE OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE JERUSALEM AREA
Those who practiced customary law in Jerusalem presented it as "tradi-
tional," without regard to its place in the political and economic domains.
This was true not only of the Hebronites, but also of the Jordanian au-
thorities before 1967 and the post-1967 Israeli authorities that accepted
the "traditional" facet of customary law. Likewise, important elements
within the PLO, wishing to use local culture as a basis for national iden-
tity, preferred to view customary law as being "traditional." In fact, cus-
tomary law was far from traditional: it evolved according to changing
conditions in the city.
Customary law is not a rigid corpus of rules; it leaves considerable
room for negotiation.22 Those who are familiar with Hebronite custom-
ary law tend to represent it as a complex hierarchy of mediators, each an
.expert in his own field. Nevertheless, it is more accurate to present the
specialization patterns in customary law as social categories, affiliated
with the power centers in society. 23 Arbitration decisions are socially
constructed, and are influenced by the social background of the arbitra-
tors.24 Therefore, customary law is integrated into all areas of social life,
and is not a "neutral and inherently just" legal system. Thus, Palestinian
society understands that the key to successful customary jurisprudence is
the power of its mediators, which flows from the support and cohesive-
ness of their clans.
22. See LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF JUSTICE II, 29-31 (Cambridge:
C.P.U. 1989).
23. These categories exist, with minor differences throughout the southern West Bank.
See SALAHUT, supra note 1, at 100-01 (discussing the existence of these categories in the
southern West Bank); 'A AL-'ABADI, supra note 3, at 264-65 (discussing these existence of
these categories among the Transjordanian tribes).
24. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 172-75 (Basic Books 1983) (discuss-
ing various factors that influence legal outcomes).
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The first category of arbitrators, known as "Manshad," hear all
problems concerning family honor. The Manshad is a person with experi-
ence and prestige and commands the support of a large, powerful clan.
Rather than acting as a local arbitrator, he may call upon other, some-
times lesser, arbitrators to deal with the case before him.
The second category is the "Shadad al-Uja." The Shadad is a powerful
figure who administers sentences and enforces punishment in the process
of customary law in cases involving the failure to honor co-liability and
guarantees. The ability to impose a decision is more important for a
Shadad than a thorough command of the minutiae of customary law. The
Qafil, or provider of guarantees, is related to the Shadad.
The third category is the Manhi al-Dam, who directly arbitrates
problems of blood feuds, family honor, land, and occasionally (informal)
appeals against judgment. Blood, Honor, and Land represent the basic
values of traditional society; hence the importance of the Manhi al-Dam
as the upholder of these values. The ideal Manhi al-Dam is a member of
a large, powerful clan, a wealthy and esteemed man, a devoted Muslim,
moderate in his demeanor, experienced, and charismatic. Frequently, a
father bequeaths the role of Manhi al-Dam to his son in families (Buyut
Islah) renowned in the Hebron hills for their power and influence, such as
the Abu 'Aram family of Yatta.25
The fourth category is the Qadi, who deals with disputes concerning
money, property, and various lesser matters not resolved by the Manshad
and the Manhi al-Dam. The Qadi also hears cases in which the culprit is
not clearly identified.26
This system of social categories of customary law arbitrators is related
to the degree of risk to the social order that arises from a given dispute.
Disputes concerning family honor are considered the most dangerous,
since the preservation of family honor is paramount to the preservation
of the kin-group, the very cornerstone of Palestinian society. An individ-
ual earns recognition as a Manshad, Manhi al-Dam, or Qadi through con-
sensus rather than appointment. Success in a complicated case of
arbitration leads to recognition of the arbitrator's charisma, and inspires
litigants to bring before him more complicated disputes for adjudication.
The choice of arbitrator is made either by both litigants or by the plaintiff
25. See, e.g., ABU-SHAMSYIA, supra note 5, at 42; AL-NAHAR, Feb. 27, 1989.
26. There is a tendency to idealize customary jurisprudence and attribute to it "natu-
ral" social justice, emanating from a primordial source or covenant. However, Hebronite
customary law is no more or less "just" than Western justice. For criticism of Hebronite
customary law, see AL-NAHAR, May 18, 1989.
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alone. There is a procedure for selecting an arbitrator, but the ultimate
reason for his selection is often his ability to impose his authority.
The whole system of these categories of arbitrators is a social institu-
tion known as Tahkim. The Islah constitutes an alternative institution of
mediation, which may account for the majority of conflict-resolutions in
Palestinian society. The Islah mediator may be anyone invited to resolve
a conflict. Whereas Tahkim entails coercion and is often paid for in cash,
Islah is an expression of social control and conventional values, and is not
necessarily part of society's power system.
The institution of Tahkim, and especially the category of Qadi, have
been criticized in Palestinian society. In contrast to the ideal arbitrator
who administers justice on the basis of his authority and family affiliation,
some arbitrators of Hebronite origin (almost the only ones active in the
Jerusalem area) are aligned with opposing political factions. When such
an individual is chosen as arbitrator in a conflict, his rivals in some cases
refuse to participate in the conciliation process. Thus, it is not easy to
create a proper balance between the various arbitrators and guarantors
who seek to solve a certain conflict or to ensure impartiality. Some
Tahkim arbitrators who deal in economic conciliation command large
fees and thus, allegedly, distort justice. Moreover, Hebronite customary
law tends to dispense justice primarily to members of cohesive clans, and
may at times dispense injustice to those who lack the backing of such a
clan.2 7
Despite the criticism leveled against customary law, it has no substi-
tute, and indeed has helped society to maintain internal social order.
However, the changes which have taken place within Palestinian society,
including the Islamic revival and the Intifada, have provoked further criti-
cism of customary law as well as efforts to adapt it to society's new needs.
REFORMING CUSTOMARY LAW
The strengthening of Islamic tendencies in Palestinian society since the
mid-1970s has intensified criticism leveled at customary law, and
prompted efforts to replace it with the Islamic Law (Sharia). However,
customary law is not only a system of arbitration, but also has served as
the linchpin holding society together and maintaining internal order.
Under Israeli hegemony in the Jerusalem area, the fine points of Islamic
and national discourse were overshadowed by the practical needs of the
Palestinian population. Customary law needed reform, but not replace-
ment. The Hebronites in Jerusalem as well as in Hebron had more affin-
27. See, e.g., M.H. GrrIH, CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE DISTRicr OF HEBRON (Hebron:
Matba'at al-Amal. Arb. 1988); AL-NAHAR, Mar. 7, 1989.
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ity to the growing Islamic movements than any other social group
Therefore, they felt the contradiction of being members of a Muslim soci-
ety which practiced customary law rather than the Islamic law. Radicals
among Hebronite Islamic activists therefore demanded reform of custom-
ary law according to the "proper Islamic way."
By the mid-1980s, representatives of the Hebronite clans expressed
their willingness to reconcile Islamic law with customary law. In August,
1985, they convened a congress on this issue in Jerusalem. Three major
groups engaged in jurisprudence were represented: Islamic scholars
('ulama), customary law arbitrators, and attorneys with Western legal
training. The agenda of this comprehensive congress included lectures,
debates, and arguments, some quite fierce, by radical Islamic activists and
practitioners of customary law.28 Even after the congress, the internal
debate about customary law continued within Palestinian society, and has
spilled over into its journalism.29
With the outbreak of the Intifada in December 1987, the radical Is-
lamic organization, Hamas, emerged from the Palestinian Muslim Broth-
erhood. It gained strength in Palestinian society and became a rival to
the Palestinian national-secular organizations affiliated with the PLO.3 °
Hamas opposed the use of customary law in society, in accordance with
the pre-Intifada position of radical Islam. The natural allies of Hamas in
the southern West Bank and in East Jerusalem were the conservative so-
cial groups relying on customary law, led by the Hebronites. These
groups were compelled to continue using customary law, as the local
court system virtually collapsed during the Intifada, and Jordan re-
nounced in August 1988 its claim to sovereignty over the West Bank.
Moreover, no legitimate Palestinian legal system replaced the Israeli-con-
trolled local court system. Consequently, customary law continued to
prevail and even gained strength.3' Islamic criticism, however, forced its
modification. For example, the style of debate in the course of arbitration
became closer to that prescribed by Islam, and Islamic traditions (Hadith)
and Quranic verses were cited more frequently in the written verdicts.
28. For the processes leading to the congress and the events there, see GIn, supra
note 27.
29. See, e.g., ABU-SHAMSYIA, supra note 5; GrI, supra note 27; SALAHUT, supra note
1. During the Intifada, a series of articles about customary law also appeared in AL-
NAHAR and AL-USBU'A AL-JADID.
30. See Hamas Covenant (August 1988) (on file with author).
31. The rituals of conflict resolution (Hudna, 'Atwa, and Sulha) that are important for
society in the Jerusalem area are similar to those conventionally used throughout Palestin-
ian society. See CATHIE, supra note 2; GINAT, supra note 1; KERSEL, supra note 1.
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The activists of radical Islamic organizations were aware of the impor-
tance of customary law during the Intifada as an autonomous system
which promoted social law and order, and helped disengage from the Is-
raeli authorities while the local system was paralyzed. The radical Islamic
activists were prepared to ignore the ideological conflict surrounding cus-
tomary law, on condition that it would be overlaid by a facade of Islamic
symbols. This contrast between Islamic and customary law troubles radi-
cal Islamic activists, but does not deter many of them from supporting it
as a social system for regulation and control.32
Nevertheless, customary law has come under more social criticism. Al-
legedly, some customary law judges are illiterate; there are different local
versions of customary law and no "true" unified one, and some arbitra-
tors demand emoluments verging on bribery. The imposition of
Hebronite customary law in East Jerusalem and the southern West Bank,
as well as its ties with the social power-structure, have evoked social pro-
test, often under the guise of Islamic rhetoric.
REFORM OF CUSTOMARY LAW IN THE JERUSALEM AREA DURING
THE INTIFADA
The co-liability and protection that the clan grants the individual, his
dignity, family, and possessions, is the main motif underlying the institu-
tion of customary law and justifying its existence. This co-liability pur-
ports to be absolute, except for cases in which the clan officially
withdraws its protection from a member who repeatedly commits crimes
that prejudice its own social position. Co-liability also is essential for lo-
cal leaders who rely on their kin support, which is a stable source of
power in the changing political environment of Palestinian society. The
eruption of the Intifada triggered a clash between the traditional leader-
ship (based on kinship) and the new leadership (the PLO and the ideo-
logical movements upholding the causes of Islam) which aspired to
reform customary law.
REFORM BY PRO-PLO ORGANIZATIONS
The Unified National Command of the Intifada was created from the
pro-PLO political organizations during the Intifada. The intensity of
events during the Intifada, at least from 1988 to 1990, led to both the
coalescence of a national solidarity which partly overcame kin solidarity,
and an attempt to disengage from customary jurisprudence. The princi-
32. See, e.g., Islamic Jihad leaflet of July 20, 1989, circulated in Jerusalem (manuscript
on file with author).
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pie of co-liability within the kin-group lost some of its potency. For ex-
ample, the killing of alleged Israel-collaborators led neither to blood-
revenge nor to arbitration and reconciliation (Sulha) proceedings. Nev-
ertheless, the scale of activity of customary law increased during the In-
tifada. The political and socio-economic tensions caused significant
friction and dispute for which no other avenue of resolution was avail-
able, due to the collapse of the Israeli-managed local courts.
The pro-PLO Intifada leadership tried to channel the resolution of dis-
putes to political bodies known as the Popular Committees and the Medi-
ation Committees.33 A Mediation Committee was established in the
Jerusalem area in late 1988, subject to pro-PLO leadership and excluding
conservative and pro-Jordanian arbitrators. In April 1989, one publica-
tion asserted: "Lately ... the local national forces have played a major
mediation role, especially in the more serious and complicated cases."34
It describes mediation in a blood feud case in Qattana (a village near to
Jerusalem), in which two youths were killed.3" The Popular Committees
involvement in resolving local disputes was not confined to mediation
and conflict resolution between groups and bodies involved in the In-
tifada, or to areas in which pro-PLO forces prevailed. In resolving con-
flicts, procedures of customary law were applied usually without
modification. Beit Sahur (a town near Jerusalem) was unique in its drive
to adapt customary law to the social and political needs of the pro-PLO
forces. "Conciliation Committees" and "Judicial Popular Committees"
were established there to replace traditional arbitration completely.36
The decline of the Popular Committees in the West Bank since 198937
necessitated the creation of a center of arbitration in East Jerusalem,
linked to the leadership of the Orient House, which continued to assist in
dispute-mediation in the Jerusalem area. Lists of politically-reliable,
traditional mediators were distributed to local activists.
Far from accepting the Popular Committees as surrogates, however,
most of the Palestinian public continued to cling to its traditional custom-
ary law, and resolved disputes using family networks rather than political
bodies. Although the Intifada created unity among Palestinians, tensions
in society and the deteriorating economic and political situation contrib-
33. See, e.g., Unified National Command leaflets Nos. 8, 9, 13, 15 (on file with author).
34. See SPECIAL NEWS-FAMILY FEUDS (Jerusalem), Apr. 1989.
35. Id.
36. G. Robinson, Creating Space: Organization, Ideology and Leadership in the Pales-
tinian Intifada 184-89, 212-18 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cali-
fornia (Berkeley)).
37. See, e.g., Unified National Command leaflets Nos. 6, 11 (on file with author); D.
Kuttab, Discipline Becoming a Problem (Mar. 22, 1989).
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uted to a state of anomie. Rather than undermining the social order,
these events led to a drive to uphold its basic values. In the early 1990s,
the pro-PLO Intifada leaders realized that they could not yet reform the
fundamental patterns of Palestinian society, and therefore would do best
to preserve the institution of customary law. They construed it as a nec-
essary evil which regulated social life and facilitated the disengagement
from Israel; and as a part of Palestinian cultural heritage to cultivate.
Thus, paradoxically, an institution that represented the traditional social
order was now exploited for the construction of a new national, political,
and social order.
REFORM BY THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS
During the Intifada, Hebronite customary law continued to serve the
Hebronites in Jerusalem as a mechanism for economic regulation and
conflict resolution. Their social cohesion enabled them, more than any
other Palestinian group, to pursue commercial and artisan activities with-
out the constraints (such as strikes) thrust upon the public by the Intifada.
Their power system, hiding behind the "traditional" facade of customary
law, successfully adjusted to the changing conditions of the Intifada. At
the same time, the remarkable cohesion of their traditional leadership
protected them from the upheavals of the Intifada. Yet, damage to the
social fabric and deterioration of public security induced Hebronite soci-
ety to seek ways to tighten social control. To achieve this, society had to
modify the institution of customary law.
Like the previous attempt to reconcile customary law with Islamic law,
this modification process took place in the context of co-liability. The
dispersion of Hebronite power between Jerusalem and Hebron and
evenly among large clans fostered egalitarianism and consensus. Begin-
ning in early 1989, the links between the Hebronites and Hamas gained
strength, and it thus became possible to couple traditional and legitimate
Islamic values. Mediation (Islah) was now considered Islamic, even as ar-
bitration by customary law (Tahkim) was construed as un-Islamic.
The culmination of the Islamic reform of customary law in the Jerusa-
lem area was embodied in the "Hebron Covenant." In early 1989, a se-
ries of crimes in Hebron and East Jerusalem stunned Hebronite society.
In the aftermath of these crimes, the city leaders, practitioners of custom-
ary law, and a large audience convened on March 4, 1989 in a meeting
hall (diwan) of a clan. Sheik Bayud al-Tamimi, a Qadi in the Islamic
court whose brother is the leader of an Islamic Jihad organization, was
selected as chairman of this assembly, which was then charged with the
reformation of customary law. On March 6, 1989, this assembly convened
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again in the presence of a large audience, including many Islamic activ-
ists. Finally, a ten-point Hebron Covenant (mithak) was drafted and cir-
culated. It integrates Islamic forms with principles of customary law: its
style conforms with the conventions of radical Islamic groups, while its
tone is that of a social covenant.3 8
The Hebron Covenant marked an attempt to adjust society to the In-
tifada era on two levels: (a) mandating social reform by defining custom-
ary law as "mediation" (Islah), thus lending to the Hebron Covenant an
Islamic legitimacy, while invoking community authority, both of which
were needed to prevent criticism from Islamic radical activists; and (b)
reform of customary law by strengthening co-liability and thereby social
control. For example, under customary law a kin-group can cast out a
delinquent member, who then may be killed in revenge by his victims
without fear of a blood feud. However, in paragraph 5 the Hebron Cove-
nant departs from custom by stating that the delinquent can be pro-
claimed an outlaw even without receiving permission from his relatives,
and the entire forum of Hebron clan representatives can declare this col-
lective outlawing. Its power lies in depriving the offender's kin of the
right to exact his blood revenge.
Paragraph 6 of the Covenant intends to prevent the evasion of collec-
tive responsibility by a clan when one of its members is proven to have
engaged in crime. Paragraph 8 seeks to deny a criminal the protection of
customary law by refusing him the right of asking arbitrators to serve as
his guarantors. Paragraph 10 attempts to protect customary jurispru-
dence from the abuse of its power by a large clan. The Hebron Covenant
placed offenders in the Jerusalem area under strong social pressure, and
established a new, communal level of involvement in the field of custom-
ary law.
CHANGES IN THE PATTERNS OF CUSTOMARY LAW DURING THE 1990s
By the early 1990s, the patterns of customary law in Palestinian society
had changed still further. The struggle between the national pro-PLO
and Hamas-Islamic factions of Palestinian society had increased. Be-
tween 1991 and 1993, the power base of the PLO was still abroad, while
Hamas's power was located inside the occupied areas. While the PLO's
flow of money and chain of command during the Intifada transferred
from the level of the National Command down to the streets, the Hamas
leadership was based directly on the streets. As a result, Hamas became
more entrenched among the pauperized Palestinians. Customary law was
38. See AL-NAHAR, Feb. 28, 1989; AL-NAHAR, Mar. 5, 1989; AL-FAJR, Mar. 26, 1989.
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conceived by the pro-PLO camp as a means of keeping its roots among
the masses. The two contesting bodies were forced to try and shape cus-
tomary law to their own image of society. Both wished to institutionalize
customary law, and make it more like a regular corpus of law. They
hoped that it would replace the redundant courts, and become the core of
their own future Palestinian political entity. This hope was reflected in
public debate. An article in a Palestinian newspaper published in Jerusa-
lem called for a formal codification of customary law by "creating insti-
tutes and national bodies ... that will use the practitioners of customary
law.",
39
During this struggle, several types of customary law activity crystallized
in the Jerusalem area. One was the important pre-Intifada traditional
type, which still accounted for more than fifty percent of customary law
activity. The second, traditional-Islamic type evolved from the first, over-
laying customary law with an Islamic facade. This constituted an adapta-
tion of traditional customary law to the new and more legitimate Islamic
radical discourse. The third was the traditional-national type, carried and
used by the national, pro-PLO political block. The fourth type was devel-
oped by the Islamic radical movements, and more closely resembled Is-
lamic law than any other category. The fifth type, termed the National-
Islamic, was formed by an Islamic group with a national orientation, lo-
cated in the Jerusalem area; al-Lagna al-Mohammadia al-Sufia.
The political vacuum created in the West Bank after the decline of the
Intifada, and especially after the Oslo agreements, weakened the ability
of traditional arbitrators of the first type to impose their decisions in diffi-
cult disputes such as blood feud cases. The Palestinian National Author-
ity could not yet compile its own secular code of law,4 ° mainly due to
opposition from the Islamic movements, who wish to impose Islamic law
over. Palestinian society. Therefore, it became important both to tradi-
tional arbitrators and society at large that political bodies linked to the
National Authority impose arbitration. In order to reap the political ad-
vantages and popular legitimacy deriving from customary law, prominent
leaders in the Fatah were appointed directly by Yasir Arafat to supervise
customary law, and to insert into its process the power structure of the
National Authority. The traditional-national type of customary law was
also linked to efforts by the national camp to create legitimacy for its
drive towards nationhood and, at the same time, to bolster its struggle
39. AL-QUDS, Sept. 10, 1992.
40. See Draft of the Basic Law for the Palestinian National Authority in the Transition
Period, Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre, 1994.
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against the growing influence of Hamas among the conservative Islamic
social strata.
On July 2, 1992, wishing to establish their hegemony as leaders of the
Palestinian Muslims as well as sole representatives of Islamic law, sup-
porters of Hamas established the Association of the Islamic Clergy
('Ulama) of Palestine in al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem.4' This organiza-
tion challenged the political ascendancy of the pro-PLO block and its
hold over customary law. Moreover, the organization could announce
that negotiations between the PLO and Israel violated Islamic law. The
pro-PLO bodies had to counter this bid in order to control the Islamic
clergy's right to pronounce religious and legal verdicts. Supporters of the
national block therefore created their own Association of Palestinian Is-
lamic Clergy which also included a Committee of Islah.42
After the signing of the Oslo agreements, the struggle for control of
customary law and its adaptations to Islam in the Jerusalem area became
even more acute. Hamas encouraged the creation of Islamic organiza-
tions dedicated to arbitration. In January 1994, for example, a committee
of mediation (Islah) was created as part of the Young Muslim Association
in the affluent al-Ram, the large Palestinian suburb of Jerusalem.
Hebronite merchants formed the majority of this committee. 43 The Pal-
estinian National Movement was supported in arbitration cases by the al-
Lagna al-Mohammadia al-Sufia. This organization was unique in the
sense that its Islamic ethos emerged from Sufi traditions. Its endowment
on the National Block of Islamic legitimacy during arbitration, and as an
enforcer of arbitration decisions was critical."
After its establishment, the Palestinian National Authority continued
its efforts to limit the ability of Hamas to present itself as the sole legiti-
mate representative of Islamic law and thus to shape for itself an in-
dependent role in a future Palestinian political entity. The Palestinian
National Authority wished to control the assets of the Islamic establish-
ment and the Islamic Endowments, and thereby to reject Jordanian
claims to have a role in managing Islamic affairs in Jerusalem. During
1995, it established its own Department of Islamic Endowments in an ef-
fort to control Islamic courts in the Jerusalem area.
Yet, the Palestinian National Authority did not neglect the field of cus-
tomary law. It became directly involved with the practice of customary
41. AL-QUDS, July 17, 1992.
42. AL-QUDS, May 5, 1993.
43. AL-QUDs, Jan. 4, 1994.
44. See AL-RAZEM, ABDAL-BALIL, (Jerusalem. al-Lagna al-Mohammdia al-Sufria.
Arb. 1992). This organization was also involved in social activity, such as the rehabilitation
of drug users. Its members used violence in several cases.
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law, in an effort to preempt Hamas in this area. During 1995, the Pales-
tinian National Authority regarded customary law as a resource to be cul-
tivated, a means to enhance its influence. It therefore used its organs of
security and members of the Fatah movement as guarantors and arbitra-
tors in conflicts, and intensified its struggle against Hamas in the custom-
ary law arena. Both sides wished to control public discourse and symbols
of legitimacy in society through control of its regulatory system of cus-
tomary law. As a consequence, customary law became a prelude to Pal-
estinian state law.
CONCLUSION
Customary law is a central pillar in the social structure of Palestinian
society, as well as a major component of culture and a mechanism of so-
cial control. This institution has been in continuous use since the six-
teenth century, if not earlier. In Ottoman Jerusalem, it reflected the
complexity of relations between the state and its subjects; and in Hebron,
it embodied the economic constraints of trade with the inhabitants of the
desert, and reflected a limited amount of regional autonomy and the need
for co-liability among clan members. The Hebronite migrants to Jerusa-
lem in the 1930s exploited their power as a co-liability group to obtain
economic resources in the City. The customary law system that devel-
oped at that time was predatory in nature.
A metamorphosis in Hebronite customary law took place under
Jordanian rule. The dispersion of the Hebronite community, the com-
plexity of its commercial and artisan life, and the constraints of political
connections with the Hashemite regime, led to the institutionalization of
Hebronite co-liability, which then provided leaders with a political power
base. Israeli rule catalyzed another metamorphosis in Hebronite custom-
ary law. It now also became a vehicle of Palestinian autonomy, and a
regulating mechanism of important economic processes. Under
Jordanian and Israeli rule, the Hebronites represented customary law as
"traditional" even as they modified it in several important ways.
The Intifada triggered further changes in customary law. The contra-
diction between Islamic and customary law, and the need to strengthen
social control, have generated additional adjustment processes in custom-
ary law characterized by debate, consensus-building, and reform. Islamic
organizations became prominent in the regulation of customary law. The
Palestinian National Authority, established after the Olso agreements,
fought a power struggle with Hamas. Both sides considered customary
law as a crucial asset in the construction of a future state. Recently, the
Palestinian National Authority has expanded its control of customary law
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and limited Hamas's role. Thus, the institution of customary law today is
not a relic of the past, but rather a part of future Palestinian society and a
major contributor to its vitality.

